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Abstract—This paper addresses a new kind of security 
vulnerable spots introduced by Network-on-chip (NoC) use in 
System-on-Chip (SoC) design.  This study is based on the 
experience of a CAD framework for NoC design and proposes 
a classification of weaknesses with regard to usual routing and 
interface techniques. Finally design strategies are proposed 
and a new path routing technique (SCP) is introduced with the 
aim to enforce security.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Network on Chip (NoC) provides designers with a 
systematic and flexible framework to manage 
communications between a large set of IP blocs [1], as well 
as their reconfiguration [2]. However, this flexibility 
introduces new weaknesses in the system and offers 
opportunities to potential attackers. Moreover the complexity 
of applications, the heterogeneity of architectures and the 
reconfiguration requirements that can justify the use of a 
NoC within a SoC increases the gravity of potential attacks. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take the NoC security into 
account in a critical system and to our best knowledge, no 
specific study has been yet devoted to that upcoming hot 
topic. The rest of the paper is organised as follows, in the 
next section we present what are the potential attack types in 
a NoC. In section 3 we detail the different guard strategies 
and the way they can be used. In section 4 we present the 
NoC possible counter attacks. In section V we summary our 
design strategy and finally we conclude. 
II. NOC ATTACK ANALYSIS AND CURRENT WEAKNESSES 
A. NoC Definition 
A NoC is based on two basic elements: the routers and 
the network interfaces (NI). In a wormhole packet switching 
network, messages are divided into packets. Routers switch 
channels to carry packets from their source to their 
destination in the network.  NIs connect IP block ports to 
router ports.  
In our context, router ports are composed of 
unidirectional opposite channels. The routing technique is a 
deterministic source routing. A central configuration module 
(CCM) is added. The CCM is a unique IP block in the NoC 
that is in charge of the initialisation, configuration, and 
reconfiguration of the NoC. The Philips NoC, AEthereal 
uses a similar module [3]. Supervising and defending 
reactions can be added in our CCM, for security reason. 
They will be discussed latter in section IV. 
B. Security 
It may be needed to combine secured data with unsecured 
components or interfaces. For example read transactions to a 
memory can be authorised to any user (IP) but write 
operations can be restricted to only one given IP.  
A system can be divided in two areas, secure and 
unsecure ones. The secured area stores, processes and carries 
critical information. The unsecured area is relatively opened 
and vulnerable. Typically, the unsecure area can be a FPGA 
that is easily re-programmable whereas the secure area can 
be an ASIC (Fig.1). In practice ASIC based solutions cannot 
be always selected. Actually for flexibility, power and 
performance reasons, reconfiguration becomes a key 
capability [2] for future SoC applications for instance in the 
domain of Software Defined Radio [4].  In such a domain, 
secure and unsecure areas can be associated to black and red 
areas respectively. 
Finally, three kinds of network implementations can be: 
• Full ASIC implementation: the NoC benefits from 
the chip intrinsic protection. The potential 
weaknesses to protect are the system interfaces, 
namely read and write accesses through chip I/Os. 
The NoC is a way to control I/O but also to extend 
the SoC vulnerable area. 
• Full FPGA implementation. In addition to the 
previous aspects, the reconfiguration capability 
opens a new weakness opportunity. However, two 
subclasses can be distinguished since bitstream 
encryption can be partially or fully used.  
• Partial FPGA/ASIC implementation (see Fig.1) 
introduces two challenges, first maintain the NoC 
functionality after FPGA reconfiguration and 
secondly control accesses between ASIC and FPGA. 
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Figure 1.  NoC distributed over FPGA and  ASIC 
C. Attack Scenarios 
Attacker may have different goals and so different attack 
scenarios. Different kinds of attacks can be identified, and 
are shown in Table I. These attack types are explained as 
follows. 
TABLE I.  ATTACK TYPE AND SCENARIOS 
 Attack types Attack  scenarios 
Bandwidth denial 
Incorrect path 
Deadlock 
Denial of service 
Livelock 
Extraction of secret 
information 
Unauthorised read 
Remote attack 
Hijacking (behaviour 
alteration) 
Unauthorised write or 
reconfiguration 
Reverse engineering Design  data extraction Proximity 
attack  
 
Extraction of secret 
information 
Run time observation  
a) Denial of service. 
 This kind of attacks aims to bring down the system 
performances. The Network over utilisation downgrades the 
operability of the system. Frequently requests waste 
bandwidth and cause higher latency transfers in the system 
resulting in deadline misses for instance. 
The three following attacks scenario are more damaging 
because they aim to obstruct channels in the NoC.   
• Incorrect path. It consists of introducing in the 
network a packet with erroneous paths with the aim 
to trap it into a dead end. The body of the trapped 
packet takes some channels and makes them 
unavailable for the others valid packets.  
• Deadlock. It means the use of packets with paths 
that intentionally disrespect deadlock-free rules of 
the routing technique with the intent to create 
deadlocks in the network. This leads to the 
contention of the channel and consequently of a part 
or the entire NoC. 
• Livelock. This is the introduction of a packet that 
can't reach its target and stay turning infinitely in the 
network, causing a waste of bandwidth, latency and 
power. 
b)  Extraction of secret information 
The aim is to read data in an unauthorised secure target. 
The stolen information can be sensible data, instructions 
from critical programs, IP configuration registers and so on 
c) Hijacking (spyware) 
This is a write access in the secure area in order to 
modify the behaviour or the configuration of the system. 
d) Reverse engineering and Extraction of Secret 
Information by proximity access 
With a physical access to the chip, the attacker can intend 
to theft intellectual property information through 
unauthorised reads in memories to obtain pieces of firmware. 
This may also be achieved through a differential power 
analysis (DPA) to proceed cipher keys extraction. [5]. 
III. PROTECTION STRATEGIES 
Standard network cipher and authentication techniques 
are oversized (time, area and power). So they can’t be easily 
and reasonably implemented in a NoC. Some original and 
NoC-oriented techniques must be implemented. 
A. Traffic Guaranty Consideration for Bandwidth Denial  
A first simple solution we propose against bandwidth 
denial attacks, consists of using classical separate virtual 
channels [6] for secured and unsecured communications. 
Virtual channels (VC) have the ability to control 
communication throughputs by assigning to some packets a 
priority greater than other ones in order to interrupt and 
overtake them. Virtual channels are multiplexed on a single 
physical communication. In literature such channels are 
already used to build guarantied traffic (GT) [3][6]. 
We use two VCs, a low security virtual channel and a 
high security virtual channel to secure internal exchanges in 
the secure area. The secure area manages both types of VCs 
giving always priority to packets carrying on the high 
security virtual channel.  
If no TDMA (time division multiplexing access) 
technique is available for time slot allocation to unsecure 
traffics, then a simple implementation consist of assigning to 
the unsecure area only low security virtual channel 
capabilities. The communications between unsecure area and 
secure area use only low security virtual channels (see Fig. 
2). This prevents packet coming from the unsecure area from 
obstructing secured packet paths in the secure area. Thus, 
secured communications in the secure area are isolated from 
the potential denial of service attacks. 
If guaranteed throughput (GT) [3] reservation is possible 
then traffic access from outside can use reserved slots to get 
GT priority. This needs the use of an interface between the 
both domains. This point is presented in section B. 
Note also that a second utilisation of VCs can be made. 
Indeed, a nice implementation of CCM control 
communications consists of using guarantied traffic 
channels, contrary to [2], a solution with a single NoC is 
required for control, configuration and data transfers.  
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Figure 2.  Virtual channels to prevent denial of service 
However this solution prevents only from bandwidth 
denied and doesn’t manage right access.  
B. Multi-Boundary Filtering for Security Purpose 
Three boundaries between secure and unsecure areas can 
be considered. Each one can be equipped with a specific 
shield. The first shield (1 in Fig.3) is an authorisation 
checking at NoC I/O access. The second is a path filter in the 
body of the network. The third is an authentication of the 
sender at secured NIs. 
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Figure 3.  Multi-boundary area 
These three levels of security are explained in the next 
subsections. 
1) Boundary 1 :  NIs Inside the Secure Area 
The entire NoC is in the secure area. Some IPs are also in 
the secure area because they are critical, but some other IPs 
are in the unsecure area and can access only to some 
information within controlled time windows in the secure 
area. An example is shown Fig. 4.  
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Figure 4.  Example of an entire NoC in secure area 
Details of our NI are shown in Fig. 5. NI contains various 
configurable parameters. These parameters are configurable 
via the NoC itself.    
We distinguishes the following elements in a NI: 
• A protocol wrapper to communicate properly with 
the connected IP port protocol.  
• A memory-mapping table first converts the logical 
global address into the target IP location and check if 
this IP access is allowed, secondly the right access to 
the local address within the target IP memory space 
is checked.  
• A path table provides the corresponding path 
instructions for each authorised target IP. 
• A slot table for GT reservation [3]. 
• A best effort bandwidth instruction for non-GT 
transactions. 
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Figure 5.  NI inside the secure area 
The CCM delivers memory-mapping authorisation to 
NIs. NIs filter the memory-mapping addresses. By this way 
irregular transactions are forbidden. A NI must solicit the 
CCM to obtain a new authorisation. The CCM can take off 
an authorisation.  
Avoided attacks are denial of service (by bandwidth 
monitoring in the NIs) and unauthorised read or write 
transaction (by filter verification in NIs).  
2) Boundary 2 : NIs Outside of the Secure area.  
In this case, only a part of the NoC is in the secure area. 
In this case we can’t have confidence in the NIs into the 
unsecure area. Not any memory mapping information is 
available. So, in this case the checked information is the path 
instructions. 
Path filters must be added in the secure area at the 
interfaces with the unsecure area (see Fig.6). In this case the 
CCM delivers path authorisation (and no memory mapping 
like in the previous case) to the path filter. 
The path filter receives packets from unsecure area and 
allows only some path accesses to the secure area and forbid 
all others. This solution prevents an unauthorised sender to 
communicate with a secured target and offer deadlock-free 
and livelock-free guaranties.  
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Figure 6.  NoC in secure area and unsecure area 
Path filter looks like NI, except that it is not connected to 
an IP and so doesn’t have protocol wrapper, and has a path 
table in place of the memory-mapping table (see Fig.7). In 
practice, to avoid wasting time, this path filters are integrated 
in the port of the router on the secured area. It allows to 
proceed simultaneously to the path checking and the routing 
decoding step. 
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Figure 7.  Path filter 
3) Boundary 3 :  Self Complemented Path coding 
A receiver needs to be confident in sender identity for 
secure reasons. An ID number is not sufficient because a 
malicious sender can use the ID of another one. To solve this 
problem, we introduce the new concept of Self 
Complemented Path coding (SCP). The principle is the 
following. The only information that can’t be corrupted to 
intend to usurp an identity is the path information to reach a 
destination. To do this the path instructions must be 
preserved during the travel of the packet from the sender to 
the receiver in such a way that this instruction set is a unique 
identity of the communication from a sender to this receiver. 
However usual source routing techniques (for instance XY 
or classical street sign) consume the path information.  
To cope with this issue, our routing technique is a 
relative street-sign with or without “forward by default”. 
Thus the choice of the direction in a router is given by the 
turn number in counter-clockwise from the considered input 
port (Fig. 8). This feature induces some key improvements 
detailed hereafter. 
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Figure 8.  Routing instruction in our relative street-sign routing technique  
SCP property 1 : The used path is not removed.  In this 
way, the path is a kind of identity certificate. 
Our path technique allows backward path computing. 
The backward path can be deducted from the forward path 
instructions and the arity of each crossed routers (Fig. 9).  
SCP Property 2 : At every router, the sum of the current 
instruction in forward direction and the corresponding 
instruction in backward direction is equal to the router arity. 
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Figure 9.  Path instruction complementing in a router  
When the CCM creates a connection between two NIs, 
NIa and NIb, it gives them forward paths. Each router 
executes the current path instruction, and then complements 
it with respect to its own arity through a round shift 
technique explained in Fig.10. The router arity is the number 
of bi-directional ports of this router (the arity of the router 
R1 in Fig. 9 and in Fig.10 equals six).  
SCP Property 3 : A complemented and reversed path in 
one way is equal to the path in the other way. This is noted 
as follows for a connection between two IPs A and B:   
R(AtoB¯¯¯¯ )=BtoA 
Each receiving NI checks SCP Property 3 to authenticate 
sender identity.  
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Figure 10.  Forward  and backward paths with SCP properties 
However an additional  "End of path" instruction is 
necessary (equal to 0 in Fig. 10) to avoid an infinite loop of 
the path and a livelock possibility. 
SCP Property 4 : A “End of Path” instruction is present 
in each path and becomes the current instruction only when 
arriving at target NI. 
In a correct transfer, the "End of path" becomes the 
current instruction when arriving in the target NI. The 
destination NI checks the current instruction to ensure this is 
an "End of path" instruction. Otherwise the packet is 
considered incorrect and removed. 
Each crossed router checks two times the current 
instruction and processes it. First, if the instruction "End of 
path" appears, the router removes this incorrect packet. 
Secondly, if not any “End of path” instruction appears in the 
path, the router removes the packet to avoid livelock attack. 
Fig. 11 shows an example. B authorises write data only 
from A. C intends to write in B. When receiving the packet, 
B checks the used path and detects the malicious sender. 
Moreover the reversed received path is the backward path to 
answer to the sender. 
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Figure 11.  Source Path Authentication 
The minor overhead du to complement operations is 
balanced with memory and communication savings since 
CCM provides only forward paths. Note also that in the 
context of security the complement operation is not 
compulsory. However, it remains relevant since it makes the 
authentication dependent on the path and the router arities. 
This technique is efficient in terms of delay and 
implementation, since the complemented instruction is 
computed in parallel with the routing decoding step and this 
subtraction can be optimised for the router arity. 
The path used to answer the CCM is stored in all master 
and slave NIs, to allow NIs to check this path and to prevent 
another NI or IP blocs to usurp the CCM identity. 
Note that the SCP property 2 has another great interest. If 
security is not the main concern, the backward path property 
is useful to allow a slave IP block to answer to a read request 
from any master IP block. By this way, not any additional 
path table configuration is needed in the slave NIs. The 
received packet path provides directly the reversed backward 
path to answer to the initiator master. So, a great advantage 
our routing technique is that slaves can ignore master 
locations, thus it enables the mobility of IPs in a re-
configurable system [2]. 
In summary, a NI may use the SPC technique according 
to two distinct objectives : 
• Security purpose: Source Path Authentication 
(SPA). The CCM provides only allowed forward 
paths to NIs and NIs check whether an incoming 
packet path (complemented by crossed routers) is 
well equal to one of the reversed forward paths. 
• Mobility purpose: Trusted Boomerang Path (TBP). 
For easy mobility and configuration in the NoC, the 
reversed path is directly used to answer to the 
communication master that can move from a 
location to another depending on FPGA 
reconfigurations.  
A transaction between a Master and a Slave is described 
Fig. 12. NIa uses Source Path Authentication while Nib uses 
Trusted Boomerang Path to answer. The SCP routing 
technique performs the complementation of paths.  
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Figure 12.  Source Path Authentication and Trusted Boomerang Path 
C. Encrypted Bitstream 
The configuration of the CCM must be safe as traditional 
high security chip, since it’s the key point to secure NoC. To 
prevent any malicious accesses to the CCM, a standard 
encryption technique can be used. This reconfiguration is 
usually not frequent, so encryption and decryption don’t 
waste significant time. 
When an unsecure area is implemented in a FPGA, a 
classic authentication may be used to check the identity of 
the IP and avoid the replacement of the authorised IP by a 
usurper. The IP authentication key can be protected with 
techniques used for bitstream encryption, this is not the focus 
of this paper see [8] for details. 
D. Design Strategy Epilogue  
The real challenge happens when the network is 
distributed over secure and unsecure areas and when 
flexibility imposes hardware reconfiguration capabilities. In 
that case the designer must pay attention to a couple of 
critical points.  
• CCM is weak point, so it must be in the secure area. 
SPA enables to authenticate CCM access during NIs 
configurations. The CCM configuration must be 
secure with an encryption technique.  
• Mobility and FPGA reconfiguration is easy thanks to 
the TBP. None any configuration is needed to inform 
the secured area about the required path to use to 
answer to a Master NI in the unsecure area. 
Ideally, the following rules should be respected: 
• NI must be inside the secure area, which is 
implemented in an ASIC or encrypted FPGA. 
• The write access to the CCM program memory must 
be protected with a strong encryption technique used 
by the designer. (Note that encryption key can be 
simply based on SPA property. It means that the 
CCM can be configured through a NI using a 
complex path within the NoC).  
IV. COUNTER ATTACK 
A. Wrong path reaction 
When a NI in the secure area receives a packet from an 
unauthorised sender, it advises the CCM. Multiple reasons 
can produce such a result so the CCM can react by different 
ways: 
• First this problem may be caused by a transmission 
error between a sender and a receiver. The CCM 
asks the sender to re-send the lost data. 
• It may be issued from a configuration error. The 
CCM proceed to reconfiguration actions on both 
sender and receiver. 
• If the error persists and error counter in the CCM 
reaches a specified threshold, the CCM identifies an 
attack and throttles the NI bandwidth of the faulty 
sender IP. 
B. Reverse Engineering and Extraction of Secret 
Information by Differential Power Analysis 
The NoC can also be used with the intention to increase 
the security in the system. By changing alternately the used 
paths, transaction observation becomes more difficult. This 
can be completed by moving master locations with the TBP 
technique. This may preserve the system against a key 
extraction by Differential Power Analysis. [5]. 
C. Bandwidth and Power Supervisor  
A power control may be realised by the CCM to 
supervise the system in regard of the expected system life. If 
the power consumption grow up over a threshold, the BE 
traffic is reduce to prevent the risk of an attack (draining of 
battery) [9].  The CCM is in charge of configuring and 
supervising the NIs behaviours. This assumes for the CCM a 
previous knowledge of the expected behaviour of the 
application. So a profiling (e.g. allowed data rate upper 
bound) must be done and some threshold must be identified 
to allow the CCM to detect an irregular behaviour in the 
NoC and consequently to launch a reaction by means of 
parameter adjustments in NIs in order to recover a regular 
behaviour of the system. This aspect is another research topic 
that can’t be treated here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Intentional fault introduction and increasing error rate 
expected in future technologies may lead designers to pay 
attention to security aspects in SoC communications. It is 
important to be aware of the potential attacks relative to NoC 
specific features. We have described how NoC can be 
protected with path filters or secure NIs. A new SCP routing 
technique allowing to destination to authenticate the sender 
identification has been presented. Moreover, we have 
exposed how this technique can improve the reconfiguration 
capabilities for performance and security purposes. Our 
propositions in terms of defence techniques to attack are 
summarised in Table II. A cross indicates a protection 
capability.  We have design our NoC CAD tool µSpider in a 
flexible way [7] that provides the designers with capabilities, 
to obtain the needed level of security depending on the 
application and implementation constraints. 
TABLE II.  DEFENCE TECHNIQUES TO ATTACKS 
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Bandwidth denial    X  X  
Incorrect path X X X     
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X X X  X   
Design  data extraction     X  X 
Run time observation        X 
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